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Abstract: Following the global success of the principle of proportionality in human and 
constitutional rights adjudication, there is now an emerging debate among academics and 
judges in the United States as to whether proportionality ought to be introduced into U.S. 
constitutional law. My goal in this paper is to correct what I see as a misleading simplification 
in this discussion, namely the view that the United States could introduce proportionality while 
leaving the other features and characteristics of its constitutional rights jurisprudence intact. I 
argue that if proportionality is adopted, coherence requires that the other features of what in 
previous work I have labelled “the global model of constitutional rights” be embraced as well: 
rights inflation, positive obligations, socio-economic rights, and horizontal effect. Thus, 
proportionality is not just an isolated standard of review but part and parcel of a conception of 
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Following the global success of the principle of proportionality in human and 
constitutional rights adjudication, there is now an emerging debate among 
academics and judges in the United States as to whether proportionality ought to 
be introduced into U.S. constitutional law,1 where it would replace the current 
tiered system of scrutiny (rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny) and 
various other standards of review. Certainly it must be true that the confusing 
variety of standards currently employed in U.S. constitutional law indicates a 
structural weakness, and proportionality with its one-size-fits-all approach seems 
to be a good choice to repair it.2 One of the advantages of proportionality is that it 
offers a framework which can indeed be applied to all (at least all non-absolute, 
negative) rights, but which is at the same time flexible enough to accommodate 
relevant differences and distinctions; for example, the concern currently expressed 
by the tiered system, namely that the intensity of review should vary depending on 
the subject matter at stake, can easily be integrated into the proportionality 
framework.  
My goal in this paper is to correct what I see as a misleading simplification in 
this discussion, namely the view that the United States could introduce 
proportionality while leaving the other features and characteristics of its 
constitutional rights jurisprudence intact. I will argue that if proportionality is 
adopted, coherence requires that the other features of what in previous work I 
have labelled “the global model of constitutional rights”3 be embraced as well: 
rights inflation, positive obligations, socio-economic rights, and horizontal effect. 
Thus, proportionality is not just an isolated standard of review but part and parcel 
of a conception of rights that must be adopted or rejected as a whole. 
The paper has the following structure. In the next section I will introduce the 
global model of constitutional rights and also say something about how it relates 
to the current state of U.S. constitutional law. This will be followed by a brief 
account of the theory of rights that best justifies the global model. The third 
section will show that the adoption of proportionality inevitably leads to the 
necessity to endorse the other features of the global model as well. The 
Conclusion will offer some tentative reflections about the direction into which 
U.S. constitutional law would develop if it opened itself to proportionality.  
 
 
                                                      
1 See in particular Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (New York: Knopf, 
2005), 49; Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge’s View (New York: Knopf, 2010), 163-171. Vicki C. 
Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 (2015) Yale Law Journal 3094.  
2 For an argument to the effect that the quality of a court’s jurisprudence will be determined more by the 
good judgment of the judges than by the quality of the legal or constitutional doctrines they use, see Mark 
Tushnet’s contribution in Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming 2016). 
3 Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2012).  
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II. THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS4 
 
1. THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS, AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
The global model of constitutional rights is best introduced and explained by 
contrasting it with what I have called the “dominant narrative” of the philosophy 
of fundamental rights. The dominant narrative holds (1) that rights cover only a 
limited domain by protecting only certain especially important interests of individuals; 
(2) that rights impose exclusively or primarily negative obligations on the state; (3) 
that rights operate only between a citizen and his government, not between private 
citizens; and (4) that rights enjoy a special normative force which means that they can 
be outweighed, if at all, only in exceptional circumstances.  
The dominant narrative will resonate with American constitutional lawyers. 
With regard to its first feature — rights as protecting only interests of special 
importance — there is an interesting parallel in U.S. constitutional law, where the 
question of which interests attract the protection of fundamental rights is intensely 
discussed in the context of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. This 
debate is dominated by two opposing camps, which, following Ronald Dworkin, I 
will refer to as the party of history and the party of integrity.5 The party of history 
argues that the Due Process Clause protects only interests ‘deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition’; this view is not relevant to my inquiry here. By way 
of contrast, the party of integrity focuses squarely on moral criteria; however, its 
proponents have been struggling with the challenge of providing a test to 
determine whether an interest — say, in being able to choose abortion, use 
contraception, marry a partner of one’s choice, or engage in homosexual sex — is 
important enough to qualify as a fundamental right. The following famous 
statement by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in Casey is maybe the most 
widely discussed attempt to capture what is at stake here:  
 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person 
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are 
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart 
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.6 
 
This is not the place to examine the issue in depth; suffice it to say that, first, 
American constitutional law does not simply regard any liberty interest as attracting 
                                                      
4 Parts of this section draw on my book The Global Model of Constitutional Rights (see above n. 3).  
5 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Harvard University Press, 2000) 454–
455. 
6 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  
                         06/2016 
 
 4 
the protection of constitutional rights, and, second, for the party of integrity, the 
correct test that separates rights from mere liberty interests will involve some 
variation of the three Justices’ statement and will thus presumably relate to how 
intimate or personal the choice in question is, or how central to dignity or 
autonomy. To this extent, the American approach is in line with the dominant 
narrative. 
American constitutional law, furthermore, does not know a general doctrine 
of positive obligations and, like the dominant narrative, insists that rights create 
only or mainly negative obligations on the state. One example is DeShaney v, 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,7 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1989. Joshua DeShaney was a little boy who was physically abused by his father. 
The Winnebago County Department of Social Services was aware of this but did 
not remove Joshua from his father’s custody. Eventually Joshua was injured so 
badly that he suffered permanent brain damage and was rendered profoundly 
retarded. The constitutional question was whether by failing to protect him from 
his father, the State had violated his rights under the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause. Rehnquist CJ, writing for the majority of the Court, denied 
this, providing two reasons for this conclusion. First, he argued that the language 
of the 14th Amendment (‘[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law’) indicated that it protected a person only 
against the state and that it could not fairly be understood to impose on the state a 
positive obligation to protect.8 Second, historically, the Due Process Clause was 
intended to prevent government ‘from abusing [its] power, or employing it as an 
instrument of oppression... Its purpose was to protect the people from the State, 
not to ensure that the State protected them from each other’.9 While this case is 
not without criticism,10 it is still “good law” and stands for the general doctrine 
that constitutional rights are concerned with preventing governmental abuse of 
power and therefore do not generally create positive obligations.  
Moving on to the third feature of the dominant narrative, in the United 
States, constitutional rights will only apply when there is “state action”. Hence, just 
as under the dominant narrative, rights operate between a citizen and the state; 
they do not normally affect the private law relationships between persons. There 
are certain cases in U.S. constitutional law that do not sit easily with the state 
action doctrine, but they remain outliers.11 
                                                      
7 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
8 Ibid., 195. 
9 Ibid., 196.  
10 David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Supreme Court Review 53. 
11 I have in mind Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254 (1964). On these cases and the issue of the state action doctrine, see Mark Tushnet, The Issue of State 
Action/Horizontal Effect in Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 (2003) International Journal of Constitutional 
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And finally, just as the dominant narrative, American constitutional law 
ascribes a special importance to fundamental rights, reflected in the fact that, at 
least as a matter of traditional doctrine, a strict scrutiny standard is applied to 
determine the permissible limitations of those rights, and as the saying goes, strict 
scrutiny is ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact’,12 indicating that it is an uphill battle 
for a state to convince a court that a limitation of a fundamental right is justified. 
This reflects the intuition shared by philosophers of fundamental rights that rights 
have a special normative force and can be limited only in exceptional 
circumstances.  
 
2. THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Under the global model of constitutional rights, all four elements of the dominant 
narrative have been given up — and often a long time ago. The doctrines and 
developments in constitutional rights law which have led to their erosion are rights 
inflation, positive obligations and socio-economic rights, horizontal effect, and 
balancing and proportionality.  
 
a. Rights inflation 
Constitutional rights are no longer seen as only protecting certain particularly 
important interests. Especially in Europe a development has been observed which 
is sometimes pejoratively called “rights inflation”,13 a name which I use in a 
neutral sense as describing the phenomenon that increasingly, relatively trivial 
interests are protected as (prima facie) rights. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) routinely reads such interests into the right to private life (Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR]). For example, in the 
famous Hatton case, which concerned a policy scheme that permitted night flights 
at Heathrow airport, thus leading to noise pollution that disturbed the sleep of 
some of the residents living in the area, the Court discovered as part of Article 8 
the right not to be ‘directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution’,14 
dismissively dubbed “the human right to sleep well” by George Letsas.15 An even 
more extreme approach is that of the German Federal Constitutional Court, which 
has explicitly given up any threshold to distinguish a mere interest from a 
constitutional right. As early as 1957 it held that Article 2(1) of the Basic Law, 
which protects everyone’s right to freely develop his personality, is to be 
interpreted as a right to freedom of action.16 The Court provided various doctrinal 
reasons for this result, its main argument being that an earlier draft of Article 2(1) 
had read ‘Everyone can do as he pleases’ (‘Jeder kann tun und lassen was er will’), and 
                                                      
12 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term – Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, (1972) 86 Harvard Law Review 1, 8. 
13 George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 126.  
14 Hatton v. United Kingdom, (2003) 37 EHRR 28, para. 96. 
15 Letsas above n. 13, 126.  
16 BVerfGE 6, 32 (Elfes).  
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that this version had been changed only for semantic reasons.17 The Court 
affirmed this ruling in various later decisions; most famously, it declared that 
Article 2(1) of the Basic Law included the rights to feed pigeons in a park18 and to 
go riding in the woods.19  
 
b. Positive Obligations and Socio-Economic Rights 
Rights are no longer regarded as exclusively imposing negative obligations on the 
state. But while most theorists of rights only started to reconsider their views on 
this issue following the growing acceptance of socio-economic rights (particularly 
their inclusion in the South African Constitution), human and constitutional rights 
law had given up the view that rights impose only negative obligations since the 
1970s when the doctrine of positive obligations became established.20 The idea is 
that the state is under a duty to take steps to prevent harm to the interests 
protected by (otherwise negative) rights. Thus, the state must, as a matter of 
constitutional rights law, put in place a system which effectively protects people 
from dangers emanating from other private persons, such as criminal activities 
which threaten, for example, life, physical integrity, or property; and it must also 
protect them from dangers which do not have a (direct) human cause, such as 
natural disasters. 
Furthermore, there is a trend towards the acknowledgement of socio-
economic rights which obviously impose positive obligations on the state and thus 
conflict with the dominant narrative according to which rights are concerned 
primarily with negative obligations. The most widely discussed example of this 
development is the South African Constitution, which contains in its sections 26, 
27 and 29 rights to housing, health care, food, water, social security and education.  
 
c. Horizontal Effect 
Fundamental rights are no longer seen as affecting only the relationship between 
the citizen and the state; rather, they apply in some way between private persons as 
well. For example, the constitutional right to privacy may protect a person not 
only against infringements of his privacy by the state, but also against such 
infringements by his neighbour, landlord, or employer. The doctrinal tool which 
achieves this is called horizontal effect of rights, where “horizontal” as opposed to 
“vertical” indicates that rights operate between private persons. The first court to 
                                                      
17 Ibid., 36–37.  
18 BVerfGE 54, 143 (Pigeon-Feeding). 
19 BVerfGE 80, 137 (Riding in the Woods). 
20 The ECtHR discovered positive obligations in the Belgian Linguistic case (No. 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252, 
the German Federal Constitutional Court introduced them in its famous Abortion I decision (BVerfGE 
39, 1) of 1975, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights acknowledged them in its first major 
judgment, Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of July 29, 1988. While these courts found 
positive obligations despite there being little or no textual support, the South African Constitution 
explicitly endorses them by stating in its section 7(2): ‘The state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights’. Here, “respect” refers to negative obligations, whereas “protect” refers to 
positive obligations.  
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acknowledge horizontal effect was the German Federal Constitutional Court in its 
famous Lüth decision of 1953.21 From Germany the concept travelled to other 
parts of the world. It has by now become a well-established feature of the global 
model of constitutional rights; one indicator of its success is that the South 
African Constitution explicitly endorses horizontal effect in section 8(2), which 
states in slightly awkward language: ‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a 
natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into 
account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right’.  
 
d.  Balancing and Proportionality 
Contrary to the dominant narrative, it is not the case that constitutional rights 
generally enjoy a special or heightened normative force in legal practice. While it is 
true that some rights are absolute — for example the right to freedom from 
torture — most rights, including the rights to life, physical integrity, privacy, 
property, freedom of religion, expression, assembly and association, can be limited 
in line with the proportionality test. Proportionality has become the central 
doctrine of contemporary constitutional rights law, and has been accepted by 
virtually every constitutional court in Central and Eastern Europe and is 
increasingly employed in Central and South American jurisdictions.22 The 
proportionality test has four prongs. First, a policy interfering with a right must 
pursue a legitimate goal; second, it must be a suitable means of furthering the 
achievement of the goal (suitability or rational connection); third, it must be necessary 
in that there must not be a less restrictive and equally effective alternative 
(necessity); and finally and most importantly, it must not impose a disproportionate 
burden on the right-holder (balancing or proportionality in the strict sense). Some courts 
have adopted tests that look slightly different on the surface;23 however, what all 
tests have in common is that at their core there is balancing exercise where the right 
is balanced against the competing right or public interest,24 which implies that far 
from enjoying any special or elevated status over public interests, rights operate on 
the same plane as policy considerations.  
 
 
                                                      
21 BVerfGE 7, 198 (Lüth).  
22 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, (2008–9) 47 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72, 112.   
23 For a critical discussion of how to best construct the proportionality test, see chapters 2 to 5 by, 
respectively, Möller, Bilchitz, von Bernstoff and Yowell in Liora Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden, and 
Nigel Bowles (eds.), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Oxford: Hart, 2014).  
24 It should be noted that the Canadian version of the proportionality test tends to read the balancing 
exercise into the earlier stages, which is criticized by Denise Réaume who argues that ‘this question [the 
question of which of the values is more important], which has so often been disguised and hidden 
elsewhere in the steps of the Oakes test, or simply not been addressed, properly belongs at the end of the 
process, with the other steps serving simply to disqualify bad justificatory arguments and refine the 
ultimate contest’. See Denise Réaume, Limitations on Constitutional Rights: The Logic of Proportionality, (2009) 
University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series, Paper No. 26/2009 at 26. Dieter Grimm makes 
essentially the same point in his Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, (2007) 57 
University of Toronto Law Journal 383. 




3. THEORISING THE GLOBAL MODEL 
The global model does not reflect the once uncontroversial idea that the point of 
constitutional rights is to limit government and keep it out of our lives: that idea 
cannot make sense of horizontal effect, positive obligations, and socio-economic 
rights. The point of constitutional rights under the global model is not to disable 
government; rather it is to enable every person to take control of his or her life. 
Constitutional rights protect the ability of persons to live their lives according to 
their self-conceptions; thus, they are based on the value of personal autonomy.25 For 
example, constitutional rights protect a person’s right to engage in free speech, 
believe in and follow the precepts of her religion (important aspects of personal 
autonomy), control her private life (including her sexual and reproductive 
autonomy), to bodily integrity (partly a precondition and partly an element of 
personal autonomy), and so on. This focus on autonomy makes sense of the 
existence of horizontal effect and positive obligations: from an autonomy-based 
perspective, what matters is not who violates the right but rather the adequate 
protection of the interest at stake. It can furthermore explain the existence of 
socio-economic rights such as the rights to food, healthcare, or education, which 
protect the preconditions of autonomy. 
What is the scope of protection offered by constitutional rights? Should they 
cover a narrow or a broad range of autonomy interests? The first feature of the 
global model (rights inflation) suggests that an approach which regards rights as 
prima facie protecting all of a person’s autonomy interests — including those of 
trivial importance, such as feeding birds or riding in the woods (to exploit those 
famous German cases again) — sits best with the practice of constitutional rights 
law. Thus, the picture that emerges is that under the global model, all autonomy 
interests are protected as rights; however, this protection is not absolute or near-
absolute; rather, rights can be limited as long as the limitation is proportionate. 
This conception of rights presumably will strike many, including many American 
constitutional lawyers, as counter-intuitive. Is it possible to show it as morally 
coherent? It is indeed possible, but to do so, we must abandon a view held dearly 
by most if not all philosophers and many constitutional lawyers, who insist that 
fundamental rights protect only a narrow range of interests while having a special 
normative force which means that they can only exceptionally be outweighed by 
competing considerations. That model is flatly incompatible with the practice of 
constitutional rights law around the world, in particular with the global 
                                                      
25 This claim is consistent with the fact that the means used to protect autonomy will often be the limitation 
of state power. For example, the point of limiting the state’s power to control a person’s sex life is the 
need to respect his autonomy in sexual matters. This applies also to procedural rights such as the 
presumption of innocence: the protection of this right is necessary, for a variety of reasons, in order to 
adequately safeguard people’s ability to autonomously live their lives, but the means used to achieve this 
is to limit the state’s power to convict people to situations where they have been proven guilty.  
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endorsement of the proportionality approach. Instead, I defend the following 
account of the point of constitutional rights under the global model. Each 
person’s basic entitlement is to be treated with a certain attitude: an attitude that 
takes her seriously as a person with a life to live, and that will therefore deny her the 
ability to live her life in a certain way only when there are sufficiently strong reasons for 
this. Applied to the case of hobbies such as feeding the birds, this means that we 
should not ask whether the freedom to feed birds is an aspect of a narrowly 
defined set of especially important interests. Instead, we should ask whether the 
state treats a person subject to its authority in a way which is justifiable to her 
when it prohibits, for example, her participation in the activity of feeding birds; 
and this will be the case only when there are sufficiently strong reasons supporting 
the prohibition. Thus, the point of constitutional rights is not to single out certain 
especially important interests for heightened protection. Rather, it is to show a 
particular form of respect for persons by insisting that each and every state 
measure which affects a person’s ability to live her life according to her self-
conception must take her autonomy interests adequately into account in order to 
be justifiable to her. Constitutional rights law institutionalises a “right to 
justification”,26 that is, a right to be provided with an adequate justification for 
every state action (and omission) that affects the agent’s autonomy. 
The two-stage analysis endorsed by constitutional rights law in almost all 
liberal democracies reflects this approach. The first question that constitutional 
rights lawyers ask is whether an act by a public authority has interfered with 
(limited, restricted) a right. If so, the duty of justification is triggered, and 
therefore, at the second stage of the inquiry the question is whether the 
interference can be justified, which is the case if it is proportionate. The point and 
purpose of the proportionality test is to provide a useful structure to the inquiry as 
to whether an act by a public authority is justifiable to the person affected by it. It 
does so by splitting up the question of justification into four subquestions that can 




III. PROPORTIONALITY WITHOUT THE GLOBAL MODEL? 
 
This section argues that if U.S. constitutional law subscribes to proportionality, 
coherence requires that it also adopt the other features of the global model, that is, 
rights inflation, horizontal effect, positive obligations, and socio-economic rights. 
To demonstrate this point, I will show in the first subsection that proportionality 
necessitates rights inflation. The second subsection will demonstrate that it 
                                                      
26 On the idea of a moral human right to a justification see Rainer Forst, The Justification of Human Rights 
and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive Approach, (2010) 120 Ethics 711. See further Mattias Kumm, 
The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based Proportionality Review, (2010) 
4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141. On the idea of a culture of justification, see Moshe Cohen-Eliya 
and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge University Press, 2013), ch. 6.  
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requires the acknowledgement of positive obligations and even social rights, as 
well as horizontal effect. 
The argumentative strategy with regard to both subsections is that 
proportionality-based judicial review sees rights as being about and based on the 
right-holder’s (autonomy) interests (as opposed to, for example, being about the 
limitation of the power of the state),27 and that this necessitates the 
acknowledgement of the other features of the global model. The point that rights 
are based on the right-holder’s interests can be explained in the following way. A 
crucial feature of proportionality-based judicial review is that rights and interests 
operate on the same plane — hence they can be balanced against each other. For 
example, when the right to private life is limited in order to protect a public 
interest in national security, then under proportionality the clash between the right 
(private life) and the interest (national security) is (ultimately) resolved by 
balancing the two against each other. Thus, in contrast to conceptions of rights 
that regard them as normally taking precedence over competing interests (for 
example by operating as trumps28 or side constraints29), under proportionality-
based judicial review no such precedence exists; rather, rights and interests can 
unproblematically be compared and their relative importance be assessed. This 
implies that the normative force of a right amounts precisely to the importance of 
the interest(s) on which it is based. 
The above point is also captured elegantly in Robert Alexy’s famous theory of 
rights as principles.30 For Alexy, principles are optimisation requirements: they 
must be realised to the greatest possible extent. When principles clash, it follows 
as a matter of logic that proportionality analysis must be employed, and this means 
that optimising the principles at stake will usually involve balancing. Constitutional 
rights are principles, and hence they must be balanced against competing 
principles, for example public interests that the legislature can legitimately choose 
to protect. While I believe that Alexy’s theory of balancing has its weaknesses,31 it 
nevertheless nicely illustrates that under proportionality-based judicial review, 
rights and principles operate on the same plane.  
 
1. PROPORTIONALITY AND RIGHTS INFLATION 
Presumably, American constitutional lawyers will not find it difficult to accept the 
argument made in this section, namely that proportionality requires embracing 
                                                      
27 See above n. 25 and accompanying text.  
28 On rights as trumps, see Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011), ch. 15. 
For an earlier statement of the same idea, see his A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985), ch. 
17, especially 359–365.  
29 On rights as side constraints, see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1974), 29–30.  
30 Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002).  
31 See my Balancing and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, (2007) 5 International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 453.  
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rights inflation. The reason for this is that American constitutional law already 
embraces rights inflation under a different name: it is already the case, at least in 
theory, that any “liberty interest” receives constitutional protection and can only 
be limited when there is a rational basis for doing so. Thus, U.S. lawyers would 
structure the notorious German cases dealing with the rights to go riding in the 
woods and to feed pigeons in a park in the following way: first, they would ask 
whether a liberty interest is at stake, and having answered in the affirmative, they 
would consider whether there is a rational basis for the limitation of this interest. 
There are two differences between the American and the German approaches: 
German lawyers would apply proportionality and not the rational basis test at the 
second stage of the inquiry; and German lawyers would insist that the protected 
activity be labelled a “right”, not just an “interest” because in Germany, Article 
2(1) of the Basic Law is interpreted as providing a right to freedom of action. Thus, 
assuming that rational basis review would have been replaced with proportionality 
review, the only remaining doctrinal difference between the U.S. and the German 
approaches would be terminological. 
There are good moral reasons to drop this terminological distinction between 
“liberty interests” and “rights” and accept that a person’s rights protect not only 
certain especially important interests but indeed all his liberty interests. Consider 
the example of hobbies: collecting stamps, playing tennis, or riding in the woods. 
Although these hobbies may be reasonably important activities for the people 
engaging in them, they do not display crucial life decisions such as whether to 
procreate, whom to choose as a partner, or which profession to take up. Would it 
be possible to say that although hobbies have some importance, this importance is 
simply not great enough to attract the protection of constitutional rights? The idea 
would be to introduce a threshold of importance, and only interests that reach this 
threshold would be protected as constitutional rights. Any limitation of those 
rights would be permissible only if proportionate; in turn, an interest that did not 
reach the threshold would not be protected and could therefore be limited 
unrestrictedly. This model, the threshold model, can be contrasted with the 
comprehensive model, according to which any interest, however trivial, is sufficient to 
attract the protection of constitutional rights. 
The comprehensive model is preferable. Its rival, the threshold model, would 
have to draw a line somewhere, stipulating that anything below that line falls foul 
of the necessary threshold and is therefore not protected. However, it is hard to 
see how such a threshold could be set in a non-arbitrary way. Would the interest 
have to be of reasonable, average, high, or fundamental importance? What should 
be the criteria here? The consequence of accepting a threshold at any specific level 
of importance would be that an interest that is just below the threshold receives 
no protection whatsoever, whereas an interest which is just above the threshold 
can only be interfered with in a proportionate manner. This difference in 
protection cannot be justified if all that separates the two interests is a tiny margin 
of importance: it is simply incoherent to attach such morally significant 
consequences to such a small difference in importance. To be sure, we might just 
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draw the line somewhere in a pragmatic way and declare that from now on, only 
interests that are at least, say, “very” important are protected. But the defining 
feature of pragmatic approaches to moral questions is the absence of principle, 
and we are looking for a principled approach to limit the domain of constitutional 
rights; therefore, a pragmatic solution is not acceptable. It follows that the only 
possible conclusion is that the threshold requirement should be dropped and it 
should be acknowledged that every liberty interest should be protected as a 
constitutional right. 
The above point is reflected in the practice of human and constitutional 
rights law. While we cannot know with certainty why, as a matter of history and 
psychology, courts have been so hesitant to embrace threshold conceptions of 
rights, it is plausible to assume that they have been guided by two considerations. 
The first is that they find it impossible to articulate a principled threshold, and that 
they feel uncomfortable about stipulating an arbitrary one, which leaves them only 
the option to take a generous approach to the scope of rights and embrace, or at 
least accept, rights inflation. The second is that judges have understood much 
earlier than philosophers of rights that, both descriptively and normatively 
speaking, the central issue in reasoning about rights is not whether a given interest 
is protected as a right. Rather, the issue that dominates judicial review is whether a 
limitation of a right is supported by sufficiently strong reasons. The focus of 
constitutional rights adjudication is on the second stage of rights analysis; and 
hence judges will be inclined not to develop any doctrines, let alone incoherent 
ones, regarding the first stage if they can resolve the case in a coherent and 
principled way at the second stage, namely by examining whether there are 
sufficiently strong reasons for the limitation of the interest at stake. Imagine you 
are a constitutional judge who has to decide a case regarding someone’s wish to 
feed birds in a park. One possibility is to dismiss the case on the ground that there 
is no right to feed birds; but this would require you to develop at least the rough 
outline of a threshold theory delineating protected from unprotected interests, and 
you have no idea how to formulate this threshold (because it cannot be formulated 
in a coherent way). Your other option is to accept a right to feed birds and move 
on to the second stage of the analysis, where you examine whether the limitation 
of this right is justified. This will be much more satisfactory for two reasons: first, 
psychologically speaking, it allows you to do what you feel comfortable and 
confident about, namely assessing the strength of justifications. Second, morally 
speaking, it does justice to both case and applicant because rather than relying on 
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2. PROPORTIONALITY, SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS, 
AND HORIZONTAL EFFECT 
U.S. constitutional law does not know a general doctrine of positive obligations 
flowing from constitutional rights; to give just one example, the Supreme Court 
denied in the above-mentioned DeShaney case that the 14th Amendment creates a 
positive obligation on the state to protect children from physical abuse by their 
parents. Under the global model, DeShaney would not necessarily have had a 
different outcome, but the court would have structured its inquiry in a different 
way. It would have argued in a first step that the right to physical integrity creates 
not only negative but also positive obligations on the state, in particular 
obligations to protect. In a second step, it would have assessed whether the state 
complied with this obligation. The ECtHR uses a “reasonable steps” test32 to 
determine the state’s obligations under the Convention. Thus, the question would 
have been whether the state took the steps that it could reasonably have been 
expected to take; in the DeShaney case, it would seem that the failures of the social 
workers concerned with the case were so grave that applying the ECtHR’s test, 
Joshua would probably have won his case. 
The endorsement of positive obligations is, I believe, unavoidable under 
proportionality-based judicial review, and therefore, if U.S. constitutional law 
adopts proportionality, coherence requires that it also accept positive obligations. 
This can be explained in the following way. At the core of the proportionality test 
is the balancing stage, where the right-holder’s interests are balanced against the 
public interests at stake. Put differently, the question is whether the interests of the 
right-holder are burdened to a greater extent than she can be expected to bear. 
Thus, proportionality-based judicial review is concerned with the adequate 
protection of the right-holder’s interests. Adequately protecting a person’s 
interests requires more, however, than simply abstaining from state intervention: 
often an adequate protection of a person’s interests will require the state to 
become active; thus, positive obligations and socio-economic rights become 
necessary. The DeShaney case is an example in point: from Joshua’s perspective, his 
primary concern is not who harmed him (the state or his father) but rather that his 
interest in physical integrity was disrespected. It would be incoherent to first 
accept – as one does when one subscribes to proportionality-based judicial review 
– that what matters is an adequate protection of a person’s interests, and then to 
require the state only to abstain from interference with the interest as opposed to 
also protecting it. 
                                                      
32 See, for example, Osman v. United Kingdom (2000) 29 EHRR 245, 305:  
 
In the opinion of the Court where there is an allegation that the authorities have violated their 
positive obligation to protect the right to life in the context of their above-mentioned duty to 
prevent and suppress offences against the person, it must be established to its satisfaction that the 
authorities knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to 
the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they 
failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been 
expected to avoid that risk. 
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The above point finds support in the case law of the ECtHR. The existence 
of both negative and positive obligations has become so commonplace that the 
Court often does not even bother to determine which kind of obligation is at stake 
in a given case. The Hatton case concerning night flights at Heathrow airport is 
again a good example. Given that the UK government had allowed the night 
flights, one could have argued that this was a case involving negative obligations 
(the UK interfering with the private life of the residents); however, given that 
Heathrow airport was run by a private company, it could also be constructed as 
being about a positive obligation (the UK failing to adequately regulate private 
industry). The Court does not resolve this issue but simply notes that  
 
[w]hether the case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take 
reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicants’ rights under 
para. 1 of Art. 8 or in terms of an interference by a public authority to be 
justified in accordance with para. 2, the applicable principles are broadly 
similar. In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be 
struck between the competing interests of the individual and of the 
community as a whole…33  
 
This approach makes immediate sense under a proportionality-based approach to 
rights adjudication which is concerned with the adequate protection of the right-
holder’s interests: what matters for the outcome of the case is not whether it 
involves negative or positive obligations. Rather the crucial aspect is whether the 
balance between the right-holder’s interests and the public interests at stake has 
been struck in an adequate (“fair”) way; and hence, the Court does not waste any 
time discussing the irrelevant issue of whether the case is about negative or 
positive obligations but goes straight to the important question of whether the 
applicant’s interests have been protected adequately. 
A parallel point applies to socio-economic rights: those rights are not only 
consistent with an understanding of rights that regards them as based on the right-
holder’s interests, but they are actually required by it: an adequate protection of a 
person’s interests requires also the availability of basic goods such as food, water, 
housing, or healthcare. Therefore, under an approach which, like proportionality, 
is concerned with a person’s interests, the acknowledgment of socio-economic 
rights is unavoidable.  
Finally, the same logic applies to horizontal effect of rights. The doctrine of 
horizontal effect means that constitutional rights influence the private law 
relations between individuals. For example, the constitutional right to privacy has 
an impact on the relationships between landlord and tenant in that it will require 
the landlord to respect his tenant’s privacy; this will be achieved by directing a 
judge in a legal dispute between the two parties to interpret the applicable private 
                                                      
33 Hatton v. United Kingdom, (2003) 37 EHRR 28, para. 98. 
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law in light of the constitutional right to privacy, thus ensuring adequate respect 
for the right. Under proportionality-based judicial review which focuses on giving 
adequate protection to the interests of each person, it is easy to see why horizontal 
effect is needed: a person’s interests can be under threat from another private 
party just as much as from the state; in this regard, horizontal effect is structurally 
related to, or arguably indeed a subcategory of, positive obligations. If we regard 
the interest protected by the right as an aspect of a person’s life which is 
constitutionally protected, then it is important that private law, too, pay adequate 
respect to this interest. 
Note that my concern in this paper is not to comprehensively defend positive 
obligations, social rights, or horizontal effect. First, I leave open the question of 
whether it would be possible to spell out a coherent theory of rights that is only or 
mostly concerned with limiting the power of the state. All I am saying is that if 
such a theory exists, it is incompatible with proportionality. Second, the above 
argument is not a comprehensive defence of the constitutional protection of 
positive obligations, socio-economic rights, or horizontal effect under a 
proportionality-based approach to judicial review because it focuses on the theory 
of rights underlying proportionality and leaves institutional considerations out of 
the picture. The main disagreement about socio-economic rights today is not so 
much whether they exist as a matter of morality; there is an emerging consensus to 
the effect that they do. Rather, the controversial question regarding the judicial 
enforcement of social rights is whether courts are in a good institutional position 
to adjudicate them. I cannot resolve that question here. My point is only that a 
commitment to proportionality will, as a matter of the underlying theory of rights, also 
necessitate a commitment to socio-economic rights. Thus, someone denying the 
necessity of protecting social rights at the constitutional level must show that the 
institutional problems with having courts involved in social rights adjudication are 
so severe that they justify excluding social rights from the scope of judicially 
enforceable rights. Maybe such a view can be defended successfully,34 but this 






This paper argued that the current discussion about proportionality in U.S. 
constitutional law is unduly narrow: under a morally coherent conception of 
constitutional rights, embracing proportionality requires the adoption of the other 
features and doctrines of the global model of constitutional rights, namely rights 
inflation, positive obligations, socio-economic rights, and horizontal effect.  
                                                      
34 I have doubts regarding the view that considerations regarding the institutional competence of courts 
are of primary importance in constitutional interpretation because I lean towards Alon Harel’s point that 
the point of judicial review is not to bring about desirable outcomes but rather the institutionalisation of a 
right to a hearing that is justified independently of those outcomes. See Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford 
University Press, 2014), ch. 6. 
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I repeatedly referred to the requirements of coherence in this paper. A sceptic 
might reply to my argument that U.S. constitutional law by and large has shown 
no great hesitation about endorsing morally incoherent doctrines — it has grown 
organically over decades and centuries, and this has arguably enabled it to preserve 
a certain amount of flexibility and pragmatism, at the cost of even the attempt, 
both of judges and largely also of scholars, at constructing a coherent system of 
thought. Thus, the objection could be that should U.S. constitutional law decide 
one day to adopt proportionality, it might continue to reject rights inflation, 
positive obligations, socio-economic rights, and horizontal effect, and it would not 
necessarily be bothered by this incoherence, just as it is not bothered by many 
other instances of incoherence that its constitutional jurisprudence displays. This 
may be true; and while I do not regard it as my task to predict the future, I will 
nevertheless point out the possibility that, should U.S. constitutional law adopt 
proportionality, over time it would be pushed towards the acceptance of the other 
features and doctrines of the global model as well. As I have stressed several times 
in this paper, the promise of proportionality is that a person’s interests must 
always be taken adequately into account (hence a limitation is permissible only if it 
is proportionate). It is only a small step from this point to the further insight that 
proportionality is inherently geared towards assessing whether an act by a public 
authority is based on a good faith attempt at justice. Thus, a proportionality-based 
approach to judicial review is less about historical and doctrinal particularities of 
the respective constitution, and more about a substantive assessment of whether 
the authority acted with the right attitude, namely one that tries seriously and in 
good faith to bring about a just outcome.35 This promise requires the acceptance 
of the other features of the global model: rights inflation (because justice is 
concerned also with trivial matters), positive obligations and socio-economic rights 
(because justice also requires the state to become active), and horizontal effect 
(because justice makes demands on private law as well as public law). It is certainly 
a possibility that proportionality would be the site where this simple and attractive 
idea would be tested, adapted, and developed in the context of American 
constitutional law, before, should it be found to be worthwhile, it would begin to 








                                                      
35 See Mattias Kumm, above n. 26 at 142: ‘Instead of attempting to make sense of authoritative legal 
materials the focus of courts engaged in proportionality analysis is the assessment whether a public action 
can be demonstratively justified by reasons that are appropriate in a liberal democracy. Call this the turn 
from legal interpretation to public reason oriented justification.’ (Emphasis in the original).  
